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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
SPAIN v. RUSHEN: SHACKLES OR 
SHOWTIME? A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO 
SEE AND BE SEEN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Spain v. Rushen, l the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District 
Court's grant of the defendant's writ of habeas corpus2 on the 
ground that shackling him throughout the trial denied his due 
process right to a fair trial. 3 The Ninth Circuit clearly found 
that a trial judge must consider less drastic alternatives before 
ordering a defendant shackled. However, the court's opinion was 
1. 883 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1989) (per Hall, C.; the other panel members were Kozin-
ski, A., and Noonan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3678 (1990). 
2. [d. at 728-29. A federally issued writ of habeas corpus is granted only if a convic-
tion was obtained in violation of the United States Constitution. See Smith v. Phillips, 
455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982), aff'd on rehearing, 717 F.2d 44 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1027 (1984). See Cupp v. Naughton, 414 U.S. 141, 143 (1973) (armed robbery). The Su-
preme Court noted federal courts can overturn state convictions only if the State's action 
violated a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. [d. at 146. The federal writ 
cannot be sought by a defendant until he has exhausted his state remedies. See id. at 
143. 
3. Spain, 883 F.2d at 728-29 (Spain involves a state action). U.S.CONST. amend. XIV, 
section 2 provides, in part: 
... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law. 
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (battery), reh. denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968). The 
Supreme Court found that the fourteenth amendment guarantees all persons all rights 
which are fundamental to the federal Constitution. [d. at 148. U.S.CONST. amend. VI 
provides, in part, 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him ... and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
As these rights are fundamental to our federal scheme of criminal justice, defendants are 
guaranteed these rights in state actions. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149. 
175 
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unclear about when less drastic alternatives may be rejected. 
Further, the Ninth Circuit found that shackling a defendant 
where less drastic security measures are available is per se a vio-
lation of that defendant's due process rights. 
II. FACTS 
A. THE PRISON INCIDENT AND TRIAL 
The defendant, Johnny Spain ("Spain"), was a Black Pan-
ther:' Spain had been transferred to San Quentin prison in May 
of 19711S to continue serving a life sentence stemming from a 
1967 first degree murder conviction.6 
On August 21, 1971, George Jackson,' led a bloody outburst 
of violence at San Quentin.8 The evidence implicated Spain in 
the violence.9 Following the incident, Spain was charged with 
five counts of murder, one count of conspiracy, and one count of 
assault. 10 
Spain's trial was held in the same courtroom in Marin 
County in which there had been a prior episode of violence and 
death.ll The trial judge ordered Spain and five other inmate de-
4. Spain, 883 F.2d at 713. "We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of 
the racist police and the racist military by whatever means necessary." Id. at 713, n.l 
(quoting R. MAJOR, A PANTHER IS A BLACK CAT 285-288 app. A (1971); D. SCHANCHE, THE 
PANTHER PARADOX: A BLACK LIBERAL'S DILEMMA 88-90 (1970)). The Black Panther party 
had a long history of violence. Spain, 883 F.2d at 713. 
5. Id. at 714. 
6. Id. at 713-14. Spain was convicted of murder while committing armed robbery at 
age seventeen. Id. 
7. Id. at 714. Jackson was also a member of the Black Panther party. Id. His 
brother, Jonathan Jackson, had led a violent hostage takeover and escape of defendants 
on trial in the Marin County Courthouse. See infra note 11. 
8. Id. at 714. Once order was restored, the police found two guards shot to death, 
one guard stabbed to death, three other guards injured with slashed throats, and two 
inmates killed. Id. 
9. Id. at 714. See also infra note 23. 
10. Spain, 883 F.2d at 714. 
11. Id. at 719, n.9. On August 7, 1970, James McClain stood trial for stabbing a 
prison guard. Id. at 731. McClain called a number of fellow inmates as witnesses. Id. The 
trial judge ruled against shackling McClain in order to avoid jury prejudice. Id. Jonathan 
Jackson, George Jackson's brother who was a Black Panther, stormed the courtroom and 
provided arms to McClain and two other inmate witnesses. Id. at 719, n.9. They kid-
napped the judge, the district attorney, and three jurors. Id. at 731. The judge was mur-
dered, the district attorney was shot and paralyzed for life, and two jurors were injured. 
Id. Following the incident, the Black Panther Minister of Defense proclaimed Jackson's 
2
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fendants shackled throughout the pretrial and trial proceed-
ings.12 The pretrial proceedings lasted four years and the trial 
lasted seventeen months.13 Spain's shackles weighed 25 pounds14 
which included leg irons and eight-inch individual wrist chains 
attached to a waist chain. Iii 
Spain made numerous complaints of physical pain to the 
trial court due to the shackles. IS Several physicians examined 
him during the trial and confirmed that the shackles caused him 
physical problems. 17 Spain also complained during the proceed-
ings that the shackles so preoccupied him that they impaired his 
ability to assist his defense counsel,l8 However, Spain did par-
ticipate in a successful Section 1983 action concerning physical 
conditions at San Quentin which was decided several months 
before the conclusion of the trial.19 
From November 1973 to April 1975, Spain and his counsel 
filed a number of affidavits requesting that Spain be excluded 
from the trial. 20 Several times Spain specifically indicated he 
actions as courageous and revolutionary. [d. 
12. See id. at 714. 
13. [d. at 723. 
14. [d. 
15. [d. at 714. The waist chain was further bound to his chair. [d. 
16. [d. at 723. Complaints included: the handcuffs were too tight (October 5, 1971), 
the defendant experienced pain to wrists (May 11, 1973), the chains were digging into his 
skin (November 1973), complaints of pain (December 17, 1973; January 11, 1974; Febru-
ary 27, 1975; March 3, 1975; March 10, 1975; March 18, 1975). [d. 
17. [d. The first examining doctor noted rectal and low back pain with weight loss. 
[d. He recommended Spain not be chained at trial. [d. On February 11, 1975, a second 
examining doctor stated the chains were aggravating Spain's back condition and recom-
mended their removal. [d. at 724. A third doctor made similar findings. [d. However, 
prison staff physician, Dr. William Clark, examined Spain on March 21, 1975, and con-
cluded Spain was in perfect health. [d. at 732. 
18. [d. at 724. On March 18, 1975, Spain filed an affidavit stating that the pain from 
the shackles made it impossible for him to concentrate on the trial. [d. On July 24, 1975, 
he filed another affidavit stating the pain caused him to become so frustrated that he 
could not concentrate. [d. at 725. On April 11, 1975, Spain supplied a handwritten affida-
vit stating he was of little assistance to his counsel. [d. at 727. 
19. Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979). Spain and five other California 
state prisoners alleged the conditions of their confinement constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment. [d. at 191. The District Court found the living conditions and sanitary con-
ditions were adequate. [d. at 192. However, the court found the use of neck chains con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment. [d. at 197. The court ordered mechanical re-
straints, including manacles, were only to be employed when such use was in line with 
the prison's standards on the same. [d. at 198. 
20. Spain, 883 F.2d at 726. Spain filed a handwritten affidavit indicating he was 
3
Tuskowski: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990
178 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:175 
wished to waive his right to be present at trial. 21 Following his 
last request, the court held an evidentiary hearing and con-
cluded he could be excluded from the pretrial proceedings, but 
was required to attend the jury selection and the trial.22 
A prison guard's testimony strongly implicated Spain.23 
Spain was found guilty of two counts of murder and conspir-
acy.24 He was acquitted on the other counts.21i 
B. SPAIN'S HABEAS CORPUS ACTION 
After Spain exhausted his state remedies26 Spain filed for a 
writ of habeas corpus alleging ex parte communications27 be-
tween a juror and the judge denied him a fair trial. 28 He also 
willing to give up his constitutional right to be present at trial since he was under physi-
cal compulsion to do so and requested that he be allowed to remain at San Quentin. [d. 
at 726-27. His counsel filed a motion on January 11, 1974, stating Spain preferred to be 
absent from trial rather than wear any restraints. [d. at 727. The motion was denied. [d. 
21. [d. at 724. He filed a handwritten affidavit one week before the trial stating he 
was waiving his right to be present at trial due to the physical pain caused by the 
shackles and his inability to concentrate. [d. In Paragraph B of the affidavit he stated, 
"Under the circumstances I do not feel it worth chancing any further and perhaps irre-
versible physical damage to my person just to claim some phony 'due process' rights 
when under the above circumstances, 'due process' really. means being subjected to pain 
as a sham and mockery of justice." [d. 
22. [d. at 727. 
23. [d. at 714. The guard testified that Spain held the gun used in the murder of the 
guards and that Spain helped bind the guards with telephone wire. [d. Further, ammuni-
tion and an escape map was found in Spain's jail cell and an explosive was found on 
Spain. [d. 
24. [d. at 714. 
25. [d. 
26. Spain v. Rushen, 543 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. 1982). On the day he was convicted, 
Spain filed an appeal with the California Court of Appeals alleging that ex parte commu-
nications between a juror and the judge and the shackling denied him a fair trial. [d. at 
763. Four years later his conviction was affirmed since the appellate court did not find 
any prejudice as a result of either of these events. [d. at 764. Thereafter, the California 
Supreme Court denied review on whether the ex parte communications denied Spain a 
fair trial. [d. Spain then filed for a writ of habeas corpus with the District Court. [d. The 
District Court found that Spain might not have exhausted his State remedies as the 
California Supreme Court had not ruled on whether the shackling had denied him a fair 
trial. [d. He then filed for a review with the California Supreme Court on this issue. [d. 
27. [d. During voir dire, a juror denied any association with or attitude about the 
Black Panther party. [d. at 761. During testimony, the juror discovered that a friend of 
hers had been killed by a Black Panther and the juror had discussions with the trial 
judge concerning this without the knowledge of Spain's attorney. [d. 
28. [d. at 760. After the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review, 
Spain again filed for a writ of habeas corpus with the District Court alleging his right to 
4
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alleged that the shackling had denied him a fair trial as it im-
paired his ability to aid in his own defense and testify on his 
own behalf.29 
The District Court granted the writ on the ground that ex 
parte communications denied him his right to a fair trialSO and 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.sl The United States Supreme Court 
vacated the writS2 and remanded the case to the District Court 
to resolve whether the shackling had denied Spain a fair trial. ss 
On remand, the District Court referred the case to a magistrate 
for an evidentiary hearing to determine what effect the shackles 
had on Spain's ability to aid in his defense and to testify on his 
own behalf. s, 
At the evidentiary hearing, Spain testified that the shackles 
impaired his ability to assist his counsel in his defense,sli al-
though he admitted that he was able to discuss the testimony of 
adverse witnesses with his defense counsel. S6 A psychologist tes-
tified that Spain was so depressed due to the chains that he was 
a fair trial had been denied due to the ex parte communications and the shackling. Id. 
The District Court granted him a hearing on whether he had been denied his federal 
constitutional right to a fair trial. Id. 
29.Id. 
30. Id. at 777. The District Court found that defense counsel must be allowed to 
ensure the defendant is being tried by an impartial jury. Id. at 767. If defense counsel is 
denied information allowing him to ensure his client is being tried by an impartial jury, 
the defendant is denied his right to counsel. Id. Since the court could not say without 
reasonable doubt that the error was not harmless in not having defense counsel present 
during the discussions, the District Court granted the writ. Id. at 776. 
31. Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 
3678 (1990). The Ninth Circuit had affirmed the original writ in an unpublished decision. 
701 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1982). 
32. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 122 (1983), reh. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984). 
The Court observed that ex parte communications can be harmless error. Id. at 119. The 
federal court is to decide if constitutional error was harmless. Id. at 120. Deference 
should be given to the fact finding state court. Id. Here, the state and appellate court 
both found the error was harmless. Id. The evidence does not show that this finding was 
incorrect. Id. at 121. 
33. Id. at 117, n.1. Neither the District Court, nor the Ninth Circuit determined 
whether the shackling had denied Spain a fair trial. Id. 
34. Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 
3678 (1990). 
35. Id. at 718. He testified that due to the pain caused by the shackles he was una-
ble to concentrate on the trial proceedings. Id. 
36. Id. at 732. He told his counsel that he could not remember events of the prison 
outbreak, but did discuss incriminatory evidence found in his cell and the guards' pro-
posed adverse testimony. Id. 
5
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unable to reasonably assist in his defense.37 Spain's attorney, 
Charles Garry, testified that he had trouble communicating with 
Spain throughout the proceedings.38 The magistrate reviewed 
the prison medical records38 and Spain's testimony at the Sec-
tion 1983 action challenging prison conditions at San Quentin."o 
Based on the above evidence, the magistrate found that the 
shackles aggravated Spain's preexisting physical and psychologi-
cal problems, preoccupied his mind, interfered with his ability to 
participate in his own defense, and impaired his ability to testify 
on his own behalf."l The District Court, adopting these findings, 
granted Spain a writ of habeas corpus.42 The State appealed.43 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. DISCRETION TO EMPLOY SECURITY MEASURES 
The safety of a state's courtroom is an essential state inter-
est,4" and the proper administration of justice requires an or-
derly trial. 411 A trial judge is in the best position to determine 
how to prevent harm to those in the courtroom and maintain an 
orderly trial. 48 He has these responsibilities during the trial47 
37. [d. at 717. The psychologist, Dr. Delman, interviewed Spain on four occasions 
post-trial, reviewed prison psychiatric records, and interviewed Spain's friends. [d. In 
contrast, Dr. Sutton, staff psychiatrist at San Quentin, testified that Spain did not expe-
rience any mental interferences due to the chains. [d. at 732. She based her testimony on 
two interviews (one was a group interview) which she conducted before and during the 
trial. [d. 
38. [d. at 718. However, the magistrate discounted the value of his testimony as it 
was "marked by hyperbole." [d. 
39. [d. at 717. 
40. [d. at 718. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for discussion on this ear-
lier action. 
41. [d. at 715. 
42. [d. at 715-16. 
43. [d. 
44. See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1071 (8th Cir. 1988) (murder of eld-
erly woman), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3176 (1989). 
45. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (armed robbery), reh. denied, 398 U.S. 
915 (1970). The court noted, "It is essential to the proper administration of criminal 
justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our 
country." [d. See also United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir.) (conspiracy to 
commit air piracy and attempted air piracy; court has an interest in maintaining an or-
derly trial), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986). 
46. See Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1988) (armed robbery), cert. de-
nied, 109 S.Ct. 1737 (1989). The trial judge is in the best position to assess the need for 
security measures and has discretion to balance the State's interest of having a safe 
courtroom against the defendant's interest of receiving a fair trial. [d. at 497. See also 
6
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and has broad discretion to determine if security measures are 
needed.4s 
In Illinois v. Allen,4e the defendant, while representing him-
self, argued abusively with the judge during voir dire examina-
tions,lIo threatened the judge, III and told the judge he was not 
going to allow a trial to proceed.1I2 The Court in Allen found that 
a trial judge is justified in employing security measures to con-
trol a disruptive defendant. liS Subsequent courts have followed 
Allen.1I4 In Stewart v. Corbin,1I1I the defendant refused to obey 
the court's order to refrain from mentioning the victim's prior 
convictionll8 and the State's refusal to give him a lie detector 
United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 615 (4th Cir.) (concealing and transporting heroin 
while in prison), aff'd on rehearing, 433 F.2d 663 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946 
(1971). The trial judge is in best position to determine how to protect those in the court-
room, prevent escape, and maintain an orderly trial. [d. 
47. See United States v. Pina, 844 F.2d I, 14 (1st Cir. 1988) (federal weapons viola-
tions). The court noted,"The trial judge has an obligation to maintain order and dignity 
so that the process can vindicate all legitimate interests." [d. 
48. See Stewart, 850 F.2d at 497-98 (broad discretion given since a reviewing court 
unable to view reactions of jurors and witnesses to a disruptive or dangerous defendant). 
See also United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 424 (10th Cir.) (manufacturing and 
distributing narcotics; unlawful possession of firearms), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 325 
(1988). The decision to order security measures is within the "informed discretion" of 
the trial court. [d. at 431. 
49. 397 U.S. 337, reh. denied, 398 U.S. 915 (1970). 
50. [d. at 339. 
51. [d. at 340. The defendant stated, "When I go out for lunchtime, you're [the 
judge) going to be a corpse here." [d. 
52. [d. 
53. [d. at 342-44. 
54. See Woodard v. Perrin, 692 F.2d 220, 221-22 (1st Cir. 1982) (first degree assault; 
evidence that defendant had urinated on the floor in the holding cell and used abusive 
language supported shackling him). See also Scurr v. Moore, 647 F.2d 854 (8th Cir.) 
(murder of defendant's wife), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981). In Scurr, the defend-
ant's conduct was not as flagrant as the defendant in Allen. [d. at 857. However, since he 
had argued with the trial judge and challenged the judge to remove him from the trial, 
the judge had adequate justification to exclude the defendant from the trial. [d. at 858. 
See also United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1976) (wilful depredation of 
federal property and assault of two correctional officers), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 
(1977). The Fifth Circuit found that the trial judge properly took into account the de-
fendant's use of foul language, calling a witness a liar on the stand, his threats of escape, 
and his conduct at a contemporaneous civil case. [d. at 284-85. See also Badger v. Card-
well, 587 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1978) (assault with intent to commit murder; prisoner in 
possession of weapon). The court sustained the first exclusion of the defendant since he 
taunted the judge into removing him from the trial and displayed a clenched fist at the 
judge. [d. at 972-73. 
55. 850 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1737 (1989). 
56. [d. at 495. 
7
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test. 1I7 The State's witness was afraid to testify due to the de-
fendant's actions.1I8 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial judge's 
decision to bind and gag the defendant. 1I9 
• 
A trial judge's ability to employ security measures is not 
limited to responding to an unruly defendant's actions at tria1.60 
Rather, it is well-established that a trial judge may employ se-
curity measures where the defendant poses a serious threat of 
escape61 or presents a serious danger to those in the courtroom.62 
57. [d. at 495-96. 
58. [d. Further, the trial judge considered that the defendant had previously struck 
a deputy in the chest and made verbal threats in court. [d. at 494. 
59. [d. at 500. 
60. See United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir.) (government requested 
and was granted a hearing before trial to determine if defendant posed a security threat 
to courtroom and thus should be shackled), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986). See also 
Woodard v. Perrin, 692 F.2d 220, 222 (1st Cir. 1982) (trial judge does not have to wait 
until defendant causes a problem before ordering him shackled). 
61. See Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492, 496 (9th Cir. 1988) (defendant previously 
convicted of escape and currently wanted for escape), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1737 (1989); 
United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 431 (10th Cir.) (defendant may have helped 
another individual to escape from federal prison and further posed an escape threat as 
he was facing a possible life sentence without parole), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 325 (1988); 
Zygadlo v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1983) (robbery, false imprisonment, use 
of firearm in committing felony, grand larceny), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 941 (1984). In 
Zygadlo, the defendant had previously tried to escape. [d. at 1223. See also United 
States v. Gambina, 564 F.2d 22, 24 (8th Cir. 1977) (attempted escape, use of firearm in 
attempted escape, and assault on United States marshal; defendant previously convicted 
of attempted escape, involved in another attempted escape, and told court he intended 
to try to escape); United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1976) (while 
shackled during transport, defendant tried to escape following an accident which he may 
have caused), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977); Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 103 
(6th Cir. 1973) (defendant sawed through a jail cell with four other prisoners resulting in 
the subject trial), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974); United States v. Kress, 451 F.2d 576 
(9th Cir. 1971) (armed bank robbery), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972). In Kress, the 
defendant had previously escaped from custody. [d. at 577. See also Loux v. United 
States, 389 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir.) (kidnapping of elderly couple), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 
867 (1968). In Loux, the defendants had made some preparations to escape, were in-
volved in a several prison escapes, and the courtroom was not as secure as most. [d. at 
919. 
62. See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1071 (8th Cir. 1988) (defendant con-
sidered dangerous since he was charged with capital murders and had previously been 
convicted of capital murder), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3176 (1989); Stewart, 850 F.2d at 
494 (defendant's former attorney testified that the defendant was dangerous, defendant 
made verbal threats to court, and previously assaulted deputy while wearing handcuffs); 
Apodaca, 843 F.2d at 431 (defendant committed dangerous acts in past); Wilson v. Mc-
Carthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1483 (9th Cir. 1985) (assault with deadly weapon and possession 
of sharp instrument while in prison; defendant's chief witness shackled; witness in prison 
for murder and was involved in transporting weapons within prison); Billups v. Garrison, 
718 F.2d 665, 668 (4th Cir. 1983) (defendant previously convicted of armed robbery and 
8
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The Court in Allen observed that a trial judge must be 
given sufficient discretion to determine if security measures are 
needed.63 In Zygadlo u. Wainwright,6' the Eleventh Circuit in-
terpreted this finding to mean that a trial judge must be given 
reasonable discretion.6G The First Circuit interpreted this find-
ing to mean that a trial judge has flexibility to ensure courtroom 
security dependent upon the circumstances.66 
A trial judge must show adequate justification for employ-
ing a particular security measure.67 The fact that the defendant 
is an inmate is an insufficient ground to order shackling.68 The 
trial court must show that a constitutionally justifiable interest 
is served by employing security measures.69 
charged with armed robbery and assault with intent to kill), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 
(1984); Woodard v. Perrin 692 F.2d 220, 221-22 (lst Cir. 1982) (defendant put a cigarette 
in someone's face at State hospital and kicked or threatened a policeman); Theriault, 
531 F.2d at 285 (defendant had thrown food at prison guards and broke prison chapel 
door); Bibbs v. Wyrick, 526 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.) (assault with intent to commit murder), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 981 (1976). In Bibbs, the defendant's attorney requested trial 
judge have two strongest bailiffs available due to defendant's reputation of violence. [d. 
at 227. 
63. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, reh. denied, 398 U.S. 915 (1970). 
64. 720 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 941 (1984). 
65. [d. at 1223. The court noted that the trial judge properly observed defendant's 
behavior and considered him an escape threat in deciding to shackle him. [d. 
66. United States v. Pina, 844 F.2d I, 15 (1st Cir. 1988) (trial judge's discretion is 
not fixed by rigid mechanical rules to deal with every situation; there is not one best 
security measure for all circumstances). 
67. See United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 615-16 (4th Cir.) (only support on 
the record for shackling defendant was that he was an inmate), aff'd on rehearing, 433 
F.2d 633 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946 (1971). Only if other factors were present in 
the trial judge's decision would this decision to order the defendant shackled be affirmed. 
[d. at 616. 
68. [d. at 615. See also Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(shackling of defendant's witness justified due to witness's prior convictions and his 
prison gang membership; mere fact he was an inmate would have been insufficient). See 
also Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632, 634 (assault of corrections officer). In Harrell, the 
defendant's witness was shackled because he was a maximum security prisoner. The 
shackling was not justified as there was no showing he was dangerous, unruly, or an 
escape threat. [d. at 635-37. Nevertheless, the defendant's petition was denied as the 
shackling of his witness was not prejudicial and less intrusive measures would have been 
less effective and more prejudicial. See id. at 637. 
69. See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1452 (11th Cir.) (first degree murder), 
modified, 833 F.2d 250 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1487 (1988). The trial judge was 
unable to show a constitutional interest was served by ordering the defendant shackled 
at his sentencing hearing. [d. However, if the reasons for shackling the defendant are not 
on the trial court's record, the circ'uit court may remand to the trial court to state their 
reasons for shackling the defendant. See Samuel, 431 F.2d at 615. See also United States 
v. Thompson, 432 F.2d 997, 997-98 (4th Cir. 1970) (trafficking in narcotics; remanded to 
9
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B. CONSTITUTIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SECURITY MEASURES 
The Court in Allen identified several constitutionally ac-
ceptable security measures, such as the imposition of criminal 
contempt.70 However, the Court recognized that a defendant 
faced with a more severe sentence, such as life imprisonment, is 
unlikely to be deterred by a fairly limited sentence for con-
tempt.71 A trial judge may also cite the defendant for civil con-
tempt.72 The Court in Allen recognized a problem with this mea-
sure as it could be part of the defendant's strategy to behave 
inappropriately until adverse witnesses are no longer available to 
testify against him.73 
A defendant may be tried in absentia74 as a defendant can-
trial court to state reasons why defendant was ordered shackled), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 
944 (1971). On remand, the court found no abuse of discretion as the trial judge felt the 
defendant might attack one of the witnesses. [d. at 998. 
70. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44, reh. denied, 398 U.S. 915 (1970). The 
imposition of a criminal contempt charge can impose a prison sentence on the defendant 
and allow the defendant to remain in the courtroom. See id. at 344-45. 
71. [d. at 345. See also Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
109 S.Ct. 1737 (1989). Citing the defendant for contempt in Stewart would have been 
meaningless based on his current armed robbery charge and four prior armed robbery 
convictions. [d. at 499. See also United States v. Pina, 844 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988). In 
Pina, the defendant continued to be disruptive despite 33 contempt charges. [d. at 5. 
See also United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
870 (1977). In Theriault, the defendant continued to be disruptive despite two prior 
contempt charges. [d. at 284. 
72. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 345. This allows the court to imprison the defendant and 
delay the trial until he promises to behave appropriately. [d. 
73. [d. 
74. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343 (trial judge removed defendant due to disruptive behav-
ior). See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text for discussion on the defendant's 
behavior in Allen. However, the Court in Allen observed that this may not an available 
option in capital offenses as FED. R. CRIM. PRoe. 43 provides, in part: 
[i)n prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the de-
fendant's voluntary absence after the trial has been com-
menced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial 
to and including the return of the verdict. 
See Allen, 397 U.S. at 343, n.2. Trial in absentia has been approved despite the loss of 
several well-established rights in such a proceeding. First, a defendant has a right to be 
present at his own trial based on the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See 
Hopt v. People of the Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884) (first degree murder). 
The right to be present at trial is also applicable to state actions. See Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1934) (murder; attempted robbery). Second, a defendant 
has a right to be present at his own trial based on the confrontations clause of the sixth 
amendment. See id. at 106. See also United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 (cocaine 
distribution conspiracy; defendant has right to be present wherever his presence bears a 
10
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not be allowed to destroy the court's decorum and efforts to try 
him for crimes allegedly committed.7Ci This measure is constitu-
tional if the defendant continues to be disruptive after the trial 
judge's warnings and the judge determines the trial cannot con-
tinue with such disruptive behavior.76 A defendant's behavior 
can also result in the loss of the right of self-representation77 
and the right to testify on one's own behalf.78 
Binding and gagging a defendant is constitutional when 
used as a "last resort."79 Shackles may be appropriately em-
ployed as a security measure where there is an "extreme need",80 
as when a defendant poses a danger to those in the courtroom or 
when an escape threat exists.81 However, a growing trend indi-
substantial relationship to his ability to defend himself), reh. denied, 471 U.S. 1112 
(1985). 
75. Allen, 397 U.S. at 346. 
76. [d. at 343. However, a trial judge should advise the defendant that he can return 
to the trial if he promises to behave in an appropriate manner. [d. This security measure 
is distinguished from a civil contempt charge as it allows the trial to continue. See id. 
77. See Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492, 500 (9th Cir. 1988) (interference with right 
to self-representation is necessary due to defendant's disruptive behavior), cert. denied, 
109 S.Ct. 1737 (1989); See also United States v. Kizer, 569 F.2d 504 (9th Cir.) (at-
tempted bank robbery), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978). In Kizer, the defendant's per-
sistent arguing with judge in front of jury required her to be removed from the court-
room. The defendant's behavior also warranted the loss of defendant's right of self-
representation. See id. at 506-07. 
78. See United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 941 (9th Cir.) (Allen court standards 
applied in determining when disruptive defendant could be removed from the courtroom 
and used to determine when defendant will have waived his right to testify on his own 
behalf), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 944 (1974), opinion reinstated, 547 F.2d 
1100 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1980). 
79. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, reh. denied, 398 U.S. 915 (1970). Justice Black 
observed, 
[d. at 344. 
It is in part because of these inherent disadvantages and limi-
tations in his method of dealing with disorderly defendants 
that we decline to hold with the Court of Appeals that a de-
fendant cannot under any possible circumstances be deprived 
of his right to be present at trial. However, in some situations 
which we need not attempt to foresee, binding and gagging 
might possibly be the fairest and most reasonable way to han-
dle a defendant who acts as Allen did here. 
80. Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632, 635-36 (7th Cir. 1982) (no "extreme need" shown 
as defense witnesses not shown to be potentially disruptive or posed as escape threats; 
nevertheless no reversible error). 
81. See United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 866-67 (10th Cir.) (sufficient need to 
shackle defendant shown by serious charges against him and escape attempts; court did 
not require that the trial judge consider less drastic alternatives), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 
1184 (1986). 
11
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cates that a trial judge must consider less drastic alternatives 
before employing shackles. 
The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed the decision to shackle a 
defendant when an extreme danger to those in the courtroom 
existed.82 That court, in Elledge v. Dugger,83 ordered a new sen-
tencing hearing under similar circumstances when the trial judge 
failed to consider less drastic alternatives.84 Similarly, other cir-
cuits have found that the trial judge must consider less drastic 
alternatives before ordering the defendant shackled.811 
The Ninth Circuit appears to be following this trend. Al-
though the court has not always required such a showing86 re-
cent opinions have reflected the movement toward requiring a 
trial court consider such alternatives before ordering a defend-
ant shackled.87 
Shackling has several drawbacks, including potentially 
82. See Zygadlo v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1983) (decision af-
firmed without mention of whether trial judge considered less drastic alternatives), cert. 
denied, 466 U.S. 941 (1984). 
83. 823 F.2d 1439 (11th Cir.), modified, 833 F.2d 250 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 
1487 (1988). 
84. [d. at 1452 (no showing court considered less drastic alternatives before shack-
ling defendant as is required). 
85. See Woodards v. Perrin, 692 F.2d 220, 221 (1st Cir. 1982). However, less drastic 
alternatives may have been considered even if they are not stated on the trial record. [d. 
See also Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 111 (6th Cir. 1973) (abuse of discretion if 
court fails to use available less drastic alternatives), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974). 
86. See Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911, 919 (9th Cir.) (court affirmed trial 
judge's decision to order the defendants shackled since they posed a danger to those in 
the courtroom and presented a threat of escape; no requirement that the trial judge 
consider less drastic security measures before employing shackling), cert. denied, 393 
U.S. 867 (1968). 
87. See Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1983) (involuntary commitment 
hearing involving permanently retarded adult). The court noted that even if the peti-
tioner was dangerous the trial court should have considered less drastic alternatives to 
soothe him such as increasing his medication or having family members nearby. [d. at 
1284. See Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1985) (court affirmed the 
defendant's conviction but expressed its concern that the trial record did not reflect con-
sideration of less drastic alternatives to shackling; reasoned that the defendant is re-
quired to show less drastic alternatives were available and failed to do so). See Stewart v. 
Corbin, 850 F.2d 492, 499 (9th Cir. 1988) (trial judge offered defendant option of being 
tried in absentia from soundproof cell with closed circuit television), cert. denied, 109 
S.Ct. 1737 (1989). The defendant refused this option. [d. at 499-500. Therefore, the court 
held that binding and gagging the defendant was appropriate since less drastic alterna-
tives were not available. See id. 
12
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harming the presumption of innocence.88 The duration and con-
spicuousness of the shackling bears on the measure of this 
harm.89 The majority of circuits have expressly held that 
shackles are inherently prejudicial,9° In Holbrook v. Flynn,91 the 
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion.92 Shackles are an 
affront to the decorum of a judicial proceeding93 and may impair 
the ability of a defendant to communicate with counsel,94 In 
Kennedy v. Cardwell,9D the Sixth Circuit noted that a defend-
ant's ability to communicate with counsel may be impaired by 
shackling as it tends to interfere with his mental faculties. 98 Fur-
88. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344. Relying on Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 
(1895) (in recognizing that the presumption of innocence is the basis of our criminal 
justice system). See also Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1982). The Seventh 
Circuit observed: 
For this presumption to be effective, courts must guard 
against practices which unnecessarily mark the defendant as a 
dangerous character or suggest that his guilt is a foregone con-
clusion. As one court has observed, if a defendant is to be pre-
sumed innocent, he must be allowed the indica of innocence. 
[d. at 635. (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976)). 
89. See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1071 (8th Cir. 1988) (court consid-
ered that leg irons were not visible and jurors were dismissed whenever defendant had to 
walk around courtroom, therefore no prejudice existed), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3176 
(1989). See also United States v. Pina, 844 F.2d I, 8 (1st Cir. 1988) (three jurors briefly 
saw defendant in shackles and defendant was not prejudiced). See also Billups v. Garri-
son, 718 F.2d 665, 668-69 (4th Cir. 1983) (not prejudicial when jurors saw defendant 
shackled once), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984). 
90. See United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 868 (10th Cir.) (trying defendant in 
shackles may have significant prejudicial effect on jurors), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 
(1986). See also Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1973) (shackles clearly 
erode presumption of innocence), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974). See also Harrell, 672 
F.2d at 635 (courts must guard against marking defendant and defendant's witnesses as 
dangerous individuals so to presume defendant guilty). See also United States v. Samuel, 
431 F.2d 610, 614-15 (4th Cir.) (shackles suggest defendant guilty before trial), aff'd on 
rehearing, 433 F.2d 663 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946 (1971). See also Loux v. 
United States, 389 F.2d 911, 919 (9th Cir.) (court aware prejudicial for defendants to be 
shackled in courtroom), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968). See also Woodards v. Card-
well, 430 F.2d 978, 982 (10th Cir. 1970) (prejudicial for defendant to be shackled in 
courtroom), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971). 
91. 475 U.S. 560, 572 (1985) (armed robbery; additional police officers not inherently 
prejudicial). 
92. [d. at 568. The Supreme Court observed that shackles are inherently prejudicial 
to a defendant as jurors may infer the defendant is dangerous or culpable based on the 
shackles. See id. at 569. 
93. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, reh. denied, 398 U.S. 915 (1970). 
94. [d. One of the prime advantages a defendant has in being present at trial is the 
ability to confer with counsel and being shackled interferes with this ability. [d. 
95. 487 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974). 
96. [d. at 106. 
. . . In my opinion any order or action of physical burdens, 
13
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ther, shackles may cause physical pain.B7 However, modern re-
straints have substantially reduced this concern.B8 
In addition to those measures cited by Allen, the court may 
employ police officers in the courtroom to promote security.BB 
However, if the presence of officers interferes with the defend-
ant's ability to communicate with counsel this measure is 
deemed unconstitutiona1.1oo Prisoner docks segregating the de-
fendant have been used as a security measure101 although this 
may cause substantial harm to the presumption of innocence.102 
Finally, an electronic magnometer to detect hidden weapons 
pains, and restraints upon a prisoner during the progress of a 
trial, inevitably tends to confuse and embarrass his mental 
faculties, and thereby materially to abridge and prejudicially 
affect his statutory privilege of becoming a competent witness 
and testifying in his own behalf. 
[d. (quoting People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168 (1871)). 
97. Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 106. 
98. [d. This concern of the early courts has been abated by the use of modern light-
weight handcuffs. KRAUSKOPF, PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS OF THE DEFENDANT IN THE COURT-
ROOM, 15 ST. LOUIS M.L.J. 351, 354 (197i). 
99. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1985). In Flynn, the normal courtroom 
security force was supplemented by four uniformed state troopers who were seated in the 
front row in the spectator's section. [d. at 562. This security measure is not inherently 
prejudicial to the presumption of innocence since society expects security guards in pub-
lic places. [d. at 569. See also United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(assault with intent to murder). In Clardy, the trial judge properly exercised his discre-
tion to add additional armed plainclothes police officers within the courtroom and armed 
officers outside where terrorist threats received. [d. at 442. Availability of such personnel 
and the courtroom layout will determine if this measure can be effective. See Billups v. 
Garrison, 718 F.2d 665, 668 (4th Cir. 1983) (shortage of available police officers sup-
ported the trial judge's decision to order the defendant shackled), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
820 (1984). The dissent in Billups, criticized the majority's opinion, noting that the trial 
judge could have delayed the trial until additional officers were available. [d. at 670. See 
also Patterson v. Estelle, 494 F.2d 37, 38 (5th Cir.) (theft of cattle; decision to shackle 
the defendant sustained because several exits in the courtroom could not be adequately 
guarded), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 871 (1974). 
100. Hardee v. Kuhlman, 581 F.2d 330, 332 (2nd Cir. 1978) (second degree man-
slaughter). At the trial in Hardee, the presence of a guard seated three feet behind the 
defendant was found to be a constitutional security measure. [d. There was no showing 
that the guard's presence interfered with the private communication between the de-
fendant and his attorney. See id. 
101. Walker v. Butterworth, 599 F.2d 1074, 1076 (1st Cir.) (armed robbery and first 
degree murder; accused isolated in prisoner dock four feet in height), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 937 (1979). 
102. [d. at 1080 (segregation gives inference accused is somehow different or danger-
ous and is not the least restrictive means to ensure courtroom safety). See also Young v. 
Callahan, 700 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir.) (assault and battery with dangerous weapon and two 
counts of murder; conviction reversed as prisoner dock may have prejudiced the pre-
sumption of innocence), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1983). 
14
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may be a constitutional security measure,lOS 
C. EFFECT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE'S DECISION ON THE 
OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL 
189 
The defendant's right to a fair trial is denied only when the 
trial judge abuses his discretion in ordering shackles,l04 The trial 
judge will have abused his discretion if shackling the defendant 
was not necessary,lOIl However, the defendant has the burden of 
making this showing,lOe The determination of whether a defend-
ant was denied a fair trial is often based on whether the defend-
ant's presumption of innocence was unconstitutionally harmed 
by the shackles,l07 Despite the inherent prejudice of shackling, 
courts have considered additional factors in determining if the 
defendant was denied a fair trial such as jurors' prior knowledge 
of the defendant's dangerous propensity/os the overwhelming 
evidence against the defendant,109 and the trial judge's efforts to 
conceal the shackles from the jurors' view, no The courts have 
103. See United States v. Heck, 499 F.2d 778, 788 (9th Cir.) (conspiracy to forcibly 
rescue property seized by United States Marshals and interfere with the Marshals pro-
tection of that property), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1975). During the trial in Heck, 
the court received threats through mail, received information that a demonstration was 
planned for the courtroom, and previously had to admonish the spectators at the trial 
due to their verbal outbursts. [d. In addition to the magnometer, the trial judge also 
properly ordered additional Marshals be present. [d. 
104. See Zygadlo v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1983) (shackles do 
not deny defendant fair trial as matter of law; only if trial judge abused his discretion in 
ordering shackles is defendant's right to a fair trial denied), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 941 
(1984). 
105. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
106. See Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 111-12 (6th Cir. 1973) (abuse of discre-
tion to employ shackling if less drastic security measures are available; burden of proof 
on defendant to show less drastic measures were available), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 
(1974); See also Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendant 
must show less drastic alternatives available and trial judge abused his discretion by not 
using them). 
107. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
108. Corley v. Cardwell, 544 F.2d 349, 352 (9th Cir.) (second degree murder), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1048 (1977). In Corley, the court found no jury prejudice as defense 
counsel already admitted to the jury that the defendant was dangerous and had admit-
ted to killing someone. [d. Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911, 919 (9th Cir.) (unlikely 
jury prejudice as trial would reveal that the defendants escaped from a maximum secur-
ity prison and thus jurors would then know of defendants dangerous propensity anyway), 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968). 
109. Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492, 500 (9th Cir. 1988) (no prejudice despite de-
fendant being bound and gagged), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1737 (1989). 
110. Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1985) (shackled defense wit-
15
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also considered curative instructions given by the trial judgelll 
and jury polls where jurors denied any prejudice. l12 
A fair trial requires that the defendant be able to communi-
cate with counsel. llS In United States v. Myers/a the Third 
Circuit considered this question and found that the defendant 
was not denied his right to a fair trial noting that the he failed 
to show that the shackles prevented communication between the 
defendant and his counsel. llII Although circuit courts continue to 
find that a defendant's right to counsel may be impaired due to 
shackling, rarely have convictions been overturned on this 
basis.lls 
ness seated at stand before jury entered and ordered to remain seated); Harrell v. Israel, 
672 F.2d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1982) (judge ordered leg irons and not handcuffs). 
111. Billups v. Garrison, 718 F.2d 665, 668 (4th Cir. 1983) (trial judge instructed 
jury that no prejudice should be considered due to seeing defendant in shackles), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984). See also Wilson, 770 F.2d at 1485 (preferable to give in-
struction, but not necessary). 
112. See Woodard v. Perrin, 692 F.2d 220, 222 (1st Cir. 1982) (no showing defendant 
did not receive fair, impartial trial where jurors denied any prejudice). 
113. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, reh. denied, 398 U.S. 915 (1970). See 
also Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975). In Herring, the Court found the 
right to assistance of counsel provided by the sixth and fourteenth amendments for crim-
inal trials, guarantees that no restrictions present on the functions of defense counsel. [d. 
The ability to communicate with the client is a necessary function for defense counsel to 
properly defend a client. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 344. 
114. 367 F.2d 53 (3rd Cir. 1966) (first degree murder while in prison), cert. denied, 
386 U.S. 920 (1967). 
115. See id. at 54 (defendant handcuffed to sheriff on first day of trial; decision to 
shackle defendant reasonable as he appeared emotionally unstable and posed an escape 
threat). In order to sustain a claim that one's constitutional rights had been violated 
because communication between a defendant and his counsel was impaired, the defend-
ant must show actual prejudice. [d. See Quiroz v. Wawrzaszek, 749 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985) (citing Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 
1328 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979)). In Quiroz, the court upheld the 
conviction despite the defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of coun-
sel at trial. [d. Here, the defendant spoke Spanish and received information from his 
attorney through an interpreter. See id. at 1377. In order to show that the language 
barrier denied him his right to the assistance of counsel the defendant must show actual 
prejudice. [d. at 1378. The trial record showed that the defendant's attorney made the 
defendant aware of the possible sentence the defendant faced. See id. 
116. See Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492, 500 (9th Cir. 1988) (communication with 
counsel and defendant present since one hand free to write notes and gag periodically 
removed), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1737 (1989). See also supra notes 94-96 and accompa-
nying text. 
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IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
Affirming the District Court's grant of Spain's petition for 
writ of habeas corpus,117 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the District 
Court's findings of fact for clear error. ll8 The court gave wide 
latitude to the District Court as the findings were based on the 
credibility of the evidence.ll9 The court noted that the magis-
trate gave limited weight to the testimony of the psychologists120 
and Spain's attorney.l2l Further, the court observed that the 
magistrate's acceptance of Spain's testimony concerning the ef-
fect of the shackling was plausible in light of the duration and 
extent of the shackling.122 Accordingly, the court found no clear 
error in the District Court's findings123 that the shackles im-
paired Spain's ability to aid in his own defense and testify on his 
own behalf. 124 
117. Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 
U.S.L.W. 3678 (1990). The court reviewed the decision to grant the writ of habeas corpus 
de novo. [d. at 716. The court relied on Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (forgery and possession of stolen checks), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 198 (1987). 
An appellate court must make its own independent determination as to whether the writ 
of habeas corpus should be granted. See id. 
118. [d. at 717. The court relied on FED. R. CIV. PROC. 52a which provides, in part: 
Findings of fact ... should not be set aside unless clearly erro-
neous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
[d. Further, the court relied on Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 
(1980) (sexual discrimination). In Anderson, the Supreme Court noted that this rule 
does not allow a reviewing court to overturn findings of fact merely because they are 
convinced that they would have found differently. [d. at 574. If the finding is plausible in 
light of the evidence, the court must affirm the finding. [d. at 573-74. Where findings are 
based on credibility of the witnesses, Rule 52a requires greater deference to the 
factfinder. [d. at 575. 
119. [d. at 717. 
120. [d. at 717-18. See also supra note 37 and accompanying text for testimony of 
Dr. Delman on behalf of Spain, and Dr. Sutton on behalf of the State. 
121. [d. at 718. The magistrate gave some credibility to Spain's attorney's testimony 
as an expert in the criminal justice field. [d. 
122. [d. at 719. 
123. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for magistrate's findings which were 
adopted by the District Court. 
124. Spain, 883 F.2d at 719. 
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1. Trial Judge's Discretion To Employ Security Measures 
Relying on Zygadlo v. Wainwright,l2G the court found that 
an accumulation of factors are considered in determining 
whether security measures are appropriate.u6 The trial judge 
properly considered the political atmosphere of the triaP27 and 
the prior violence in the same courtroom.128 He also considered 
the violent crimes allegedly committed by Spain,129 the threat 
that Spain might try to escape, ISO and Spain's disruptions during 
the pretrial proceedings. lSI These combined factors gave the 
trial judge adequate justification to employ some type of secur-
ity measure. IS2 
2. Trial Judge's Decision To Order Defendant Shackled 
The court next considered whether the trial judge abused 
his discretion in employing shackles as a security measure. ISS 
Relying on the finding by the Court in Illinois v. AllenlS4 that 
binding and gagging should be done only as a "last resort", l3Ci 
the Ninth Circuit noted that shackling is constitutional only if 
less drastic alternatives are not available. ls6 The court observed 
that there are several burdens associated with shackling.ls7 
Therefore, it is the duty of the trial judge to weigh the benefits 
and burdens of shackling against other alternatives. ls8 The court 
noted that an accused's presumption of innocence is jeopardized 
when the accused must appear in shackles. ls9 In the instant case, 
the prejudice was great because the shackles were extensive, 
125. 720 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 941 (1984). 
126. Spain, 883 F.2d at 719. 
127. [d. Spain was a Black Panther. See supra note 4. 
128. Spain, 883 F.2d at 719. 
129. [d. 
130. [d. 
131. [d. at 719. Spain interrupted the pretrial proceedings on thirteen occasions be-
tween April 17, 1972 and March 14, 1975. [d. at 719 n.10. 
132. [d. at 719-20. 
133. [d. at 716. 
134. 397 U.S. 337, reh. denied, 398 U.S. 915 (1970). 
135. [d. at 344. 
136. See Spain, 883 F.2d at 721. 
137. See id. at 720. See also supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text for discussion 
of the burdens or disadvantages shackling imposes upon a defendant. 
138. Spain, 883 F.2d at 721. 
139. [d. 
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highly visible, and were on for a lengthy duration.140 In addition, 
Spain's ability to communicate with counsel was significantly 
impaired141 and judicial dignity was clearly diminished as five 
defendants were heavily chained throughout the triaP42 Finally, 
the court observed that Spain's mental faculties were im-
paired 143 and he suffered physical pain because of the 
shackles. 144 
As each burden associated with shackling was present in the 
instant case, the Ninth Circuit considered whether less drastic 
alternatives were available.1411 The court noted that the trial 
judge considered allowing the defendant to remain unrestrained, 
but did not find that to be an acceptable alternative.148 The 
court considered the constitutional alternatives set out in Al-
len. 147 Citing Spain for contempt would have been meaningless 
because of his prior sentence of life imprisonment.H8 
Excluding Spain from the trial would have been a less dras-
tic and constitutional alternative,149 notwithstanding defendant's 
right to be present at trial. 1110 
The Ninth Circuit then found that the trial judge abused 
his discretion by ordering Spain shackled, as he did not consider 
140. [d. at 722. 
141. [d. The court relied on FED. R. CIV. PROC. 52a and also found the magistrate's 
findings plausible in light of the evidence. [d. 
142. [d. This was recognized by the court as the least weighty concern. [d. 
143. [d. Again, the court relied on FED. R. CIV. PROC. 52a in finding the record 
clearly supported this finding. Spain complained of the same throughout the trial and 
this was consistent with the magistrate's findings that Spain's ability to communicate 
with counsel was impaired. [d. 
144. [d. The court found it was not implausible that a man wearing twenty-five 
pounds of chains for five years would suffer physical pain. [d. 
145. [d. at 728. 
146. [d. at 726. The court interpreted the trial judge's statement that he considered 
all options from total restraint to no restraint to mean that only those two options were 
considered. [d. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. at 728. The court relied on Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, reh. denied, 
398 U.S. 915 (1970). [d. at 726. 
150. [d. The court relied on United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 , reh. de-
nied, 471 U.S. 1112 (1985). The Supreme Court found that a defendant has a right to 
confront witnesses, help prepare his own defense, listen to the testimony, and testify on 
his own behalf. [d. See also Badger v. Cardwell, 587 F.2d 968, 970 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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this alternative.lIH The court observed that excluding Spain from 
trial would have at least eliminated Spain's physical painl112 and 
allowed him to better assist in his own defense. lII3 
The court concluded its analysis by noting that the objec-
tive of providing a safe, secure courtroom could have been met 
by this action.1114 This alternative would have been as beneficial 
to the courtroom and less burdensome to Spain.11111 Therefore, 
the court held that Spain's due process right to a fair trial had 
been deniedl116 and the District Court's grant of Spain's writ of 
habeas corpus was affirmed.1117 
B. DISSENTING OPINION 
Dissenting, Judge Noonanl118 asserted that the majority con-
sidered the wrong question. 1119 Relying on Stewart v. Corbin,160 
he urged that the question was not whether the trial judge 
abused his discretion in shackling the defendant, but whether he 
abused it to the extent that Spain did not receive a fair trial or 
was denied his right to counsel.161 The trial judge is required to 
balance the potential danger to the courtroom against any 
prejudice the defendant might suffer because of the shackling.162 
Due to the extreme danger presented by Spain,163 continuing 
unreported incidents,164 the ability of prisoners to inflict harm 
with ordinary utensils/611 and the other extraordinary circum-
151. Spain, 883 F.2d at 728. The court noted that the trial judge stated at an evi-
dentiary hearing that he did not think it was possible to exclude Spain from trial once it 
began. Id. at 727-28, n.18. 
152. Id. at 728. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 728-29. 
158. Spain, 883 F.2d at 729 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
159. Id. 
160. 850 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1737 (1989). 
161. Spain, 883 F.2d at 729-30 (Noonan, J. dissenting). 
162. Id. at 730. 
163. Id. at 730-31. 
164. See id. at 731. Judge Noonan stated that the trial judge attempted to keep 
knowledge of these incidents from the jury due to fear it might prejudice the jury, but 
does not mention what these incidents were. See id. 
165. Id. Relying on Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1988) (maximum 
security prisoners filed for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that prison conditions consti-
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stances which were present,ISS Judge Noonan believed the trial 
judge was justified in shackling Spain.ls7 
Judge Noonan agreed that reviewing for clear error was the 
appropriate standard of review of factual findings. ls8 However, 
he observed that findings of fact should be overturned if the ap-
pellate court has a firm conviction that error was made. ls9 In 
Spain, the magistrate discounted much of the live testimony 
and relied on documentary evidence in making her findings. 17o 
Further, Spain demonstrated his ability to effectively aid his de-
fense counsel by successfully pursuing habeas relief for prison 
conditions.171 Therefore, the appellate court should not have ac-
cepted the District Court's findings of fact.172 
In addition, Judge Noonan observed that the Court in Allen 
did not intend that courts interpret the phrase "last resort" lit-
erally.l7S Rather, he urged shackles may be used in "extreme 
need", where "urgently demanded due to the circumstances", 
where there is a serious threat of danger to those in the court-
room, or a serious threat of escape. l74 
As such concerns were present, shackles were inappropriate 
only if the defendant showed less drastic alternatives were avail-
able.17& It is the defendant's burden to show less drastic alterna-
tives were available.178 Spain did not make this showing by dem-
onstrating that he requested to be absent from trialp7 The 
tuted cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3193 (1989). That court 
noted that bulbs, pencils, and bare hands are used by maximum security prisoners to 
maim and kill. [d. 
166. Spain, 883 F.2d at 731 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
167. [d. at 738-39. 
168. [d. See also supra note 118. 
169. Spain, 883 F.2d at 733. Judge Noonan relied on Goodman v. Lukens Steel, 777 
F.2d 113, 128 (3rd Cir. 1985) (class action employment discrimination), cert. dismissed, 
487 U.S. 1211 (1988). That court found that an appellate court should set fact findings 
aside if the court has a firm conviction mistake was committed. See id. 
170. Spain, 883 F.2d at 733. 
171. [d. at 734-36 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
172. [d. 
173. [d. at 736. 
174. [d. 
175. [d. at 737. 
176. [d. 
177. [d. Judge Noonan did not believe that mere requests to be tried in absentia 
demonstrated that this security measure was available to the trial court. See id. 
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dissent urged that the majority erroneously conducted its own 
fact-finding and determined this alternative was available.178 
Judge Noonan did not believe absence from trial was less 
drastic as the right to confront one's accusers is a fundamental 
right guaranteed by the United States Constitution.179 Further, 
excluding Spain from trial might have deprived him of immedi-
ate communication with his counsel during the trial.180 
The trial judge specifically indicated that he considered all 
the options.181 Judge Noonan concluded that Spain's right to a 
fair trial was not denied and he would have overturned the Dis-
trict Court's grant of Spain's writ of habeas corpus.182 
V. CRITIQUE 
In Spain183 , the Ninth Circuit provided a sound interpreta-
tion of "last resort." The court properly observed that the Su-
preme Court found shackling had more serious potential draw-
backs than other security measures. 18' Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to require that a trial judge consider other security 
measures, including trying the defendant in absentia, before or-
dering a defendant shackled. 
However, comparing the instant case to the Ninth Circuit's 
recent opinion in Stewart, it is unclear when it is proper to order 
shackling. More specifically, it is unclear when less drastic secur-
ity measures cease to be an available alternative. Apparently, 
the court places significant weight on the willingness of the de-
fendant to be excluded from the trial. In determining if trying 
the defendant in absentia is an available security measure, it 
appears improper to focus on the defendant's willingness. Such 
cooperation may not be forthcoming, as in Stewart,18& or the de-
178. 1d. 
179. 1d. at 737. 
180. 1d. at 738. 
181. 1d. at 737. Judge Noonan interpreted the trial judge's statement that he consid-
ered "all the options" to mean he did just that, and not merely the two options cited by 
the majority. 1d. 
182. 1d. at 739. 
183. 883 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3678 (1990). 
184. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra note 87. 
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fendant may state his willingness in such a manner as to indi-
cate a "hidden agenda" as in Spain. Spain qualified his requests 
by indicating he was being compelled to give up his "phony due 
process" right to be present at his own trial. The dissent recog-
nized that Spain's requests may have been an attempt to estab-
lish grounds for an appeal. l86 A trial judge faced with such "will-
ingness" is uncertain if a defendant is freely consenting to being 
tried in absentia or has, in effect, refused this option. In such 
circumstances, it may be impossible for the trial judge to deter-
mine if trying the defendant in absentia is an appropriate 
option. 
Further, focusing on the defendant's consent is somewhat 
inconsistent with Allen. Allen, expressly approved of the trial 
court's decision to try the defendant in absentia despite the de-
fendant's unwillingness.187 
The better approach is to analyze the potential effects of 
the proposed shackling upon the defendant. The trial judge 
should determine if another security measure, such as trying the 
defendant in absentia, is likely to have less prejudicial effects. 
Such an analysis is consistent with Allenl88 as it may not always 
be clear which security measure is less drastic or less detrimen-
taP8S This approach is more rational and provides clearer guid-
ance to trial judges than mandating trial in absentia wherever 
the defendant does not object to its use. 
Spain presents a significant departure from prior due pro-
cess claims that shackling led to a denial of a fair trial. The ma-
186. Spain, 883 F.2d at 738. Dissenting, Judge Noonan noted, "If that had been 
done the petition before us now might allege that he had been deprived of his right to 
confront the witnesses against him and his right to confer immediately with counsel." [d. 
at 738. The majority answers this concern by asserting such an appeal would have been 
groundless if trying Spain in absentia was determined to be the least drastic alternative 
available. See id. at 728,n.22. 
187. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 340, reh. denied, 398 U.S. 915 (1970). 
188. [d. at 343. The Supreme Court observed that there is not one best measure for 
all circumstances. See id. The Court further observed that despite approving binding 
and gagging a defendant only when used as a "last resort", there may be circumstances 
when it would be the fairest security measure. See id. at 344. 
189. See Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492, 499 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 
1737 (1989). In Stewart, the gag was periodically removed so the defendant could confer 
with counsel. One hand was left free so the defendant could write notes and the defend-
ant did not make any complaints of pain or that he experienced interference with his 
mental faculties. [d. 
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jority of courts have focused on the prejudice to the defendant 
in analyzing such cases.190 Accordingly, those courts have con-
sistently held that the trial judge's decision may not have af-
fected the outcome of the trial. In Spain, the Ninth Circuit ob-
served the potential harm to Spain's presumption of 
innocence,191 but based its decision on his ability to aid in his 
own defense.192 Despite the different approach, the reasoning is 
valid as shackling does potentially interfere with the defendant's 
ability to aid in his own defense.198 
The decision in Spain is seemingly at odds with prior Ninth 
Circuit decisions as well as those of other circuits in establishing 
a per se violation of a defendant's due process rights if less dras-
tic alternatives were available and not considered. As due pro-
cess rights exist to ensure fairness, this standard, on its face, 
would seem unwarranted where the defendant does not show the 
shackling denied him a fair trial. However, it is evident that a 
shackled defendant has a difficult time demonstrating that the 
trial outcome was unfairly affected because of the shackles. Con-
victions have rarely been overturned as shackled defendants 
often have a history of past violence or have considerable evi-
dence against them leading to the decision to order them shack-
led. 19• Absent the standard of a per se due process violation, a 
trial judge would not be deterred from using shackles even 
where less drastic alternatives were available. The standard an-
nounced by the Ninth Circuit preserves the trial judge's discre-
tion in ordering security measures and also provides protection 
for a defendant against unreasonable use of shackling. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit has provided a clear explanation of "last 
resort." It is evident that future trial courts must consider less 
drastic alternatives before ordering shackling. However, the 
court has gone further than the other circuits in holding that a 
failure to do so, in and of itself, denies a defendant a fair trial. 
This should serve as strong notice to all trial courts that the 
190. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
192. See supra notes 141 and 153 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra notes 94·96 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra notes 108·09 and accompanying text. 
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consequences of failing to demonstrate consideration of less 
drastic alternatives will result in an overturned conviction even 
if the shackling did not affect the defendant's presumption of 
innocence or his ability to assist in his own defense. lell 
Randall E. Tuskowski* 
195. The Marin County District Attorney has decided not to retry Spain. San Fran-
cisco Banner Daily Journal, Monday, April 30, 1990, at 2, col. 4. He noted that Spain has 
been on parole since 1988 and would unlikely receive a jail sentence if convicted. [d. 
Further, a retrial would require that the deceased guards' family members and surviving 
guards relive the tragedy. See id. 
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